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安達裕之准教授による論文が査読付き国際学術誌「Games and Economic Behavior」に掲載されました

2026年11月19日

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経済学プログラムの安達裕之准教授による論文が査読付き国際学術誌「Games and Economic Behavior」に掲載されました。

【論文タイトル】Multidimensional mechanism design and robust revenue maximization in multi-object auctions

【要旨】Under the private-values assumption with possibly correlated types, I consider revenue maximization in multi-object auctions with each buyer having additive valuations and with fairly general feasibility constraints. After calculating buyers’ virtual valuation vectors using the revenue equivalence theorem, I identify an upper bound for the seller’s expected revenue obtainable among all Bayesian incentive compatible (random) mechanisms satisfying each buyer’s interim individual rationality. I introduce a multidimensional regularity condition under which I can construct a dominant-strategy incentive compatible (random) mechanism which maximizes the revenue. When the multidimensional regularity condition is violated, I develop an ironing procedure which allows me to construct such a mechanism. To derive those results, I show that ray monotonicity, which is seemingly weaker than monotonicity, is equivalent to dominant-strategy implementability under the appropriate conditions.

【掲載誌】Games and Economic Behavior (2026年11月13日電子版先行公開・採択済み)

【著者】Hiroyuki Adachi

【doi】https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2026.104084